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Abstract
The notion of commitment is widely studied as
a high-level abstraction for modeling multiagent
interaction. An important challenge is supporting
flexible decentralized enactments of commitment
specifications. In this paper, we combine recent
advances on specifying commitments and informa-
tion protocols. Specifically, we contribute Tosca,
a technique for automatically synthesizing infor-
mation protocols from commitment specifications.
Our main result is that the synthesized protocols
support commitment alignment, which is the idea
that agents must make compatible inferences about
their commitments despite decentralization.
1 Introduction
Commitments represent a high-level abstraction for mod-
eling multiagent interaction [Singh, 1999]. The main idea
behind commitment protocols is to specify the meanings
of messages in terms of commitments [Pitt et al., 2001;
Yolum and Singh, 2002]. For example, to capture a purchase,
one may specify that a Quote message means creating a
commitment from the seller to the buyer to deliver an item in
exchange for payment. In addition to meanings, a commit-
ment protocol typically also specifies operational constraints
such as message ordering and occurrence. Thus, for example,
onewould specify that theQuotemessage cannot occur before
the Request For Quote message from the buyer to the seller.
Intuitively, the motivation behind operational constraints is to
rule out causally invalid protocol enactments.
A fundamental challenge in this line of work has been
supporting decentralized enactments of commitment pro-
tocols, that is, in shared nothing settings where agents
communicate asynchronously. Specifically, the only way
for one agent to convey information to another is to send
it a message. Supporting decentralized enactments in such
settings is nontrivial because agents may observe messages
in incompatible orders. Specifically, decentralization may
lead to situations where agents deadlock (lack of liveness),
observe inconsistent messages (lack of safety), or come
to incompatible conclusions about commitments that hold
between them (lack of alignment [Chopra and Singh, 2008;
Chopra and Singh, 2009; Chopra and Singh, 2015b])—all
three properties being crucial to interoperability.
Tosca addresses the challenge of decentralized en-
actments. It builds upon the conceptual observation
that commitment specification and operational con-
straints are distinct concerns [Chopra and Singh, 2008;
Baldoni et al., 2013]. For simplicity and clarity, from here on,
we reserve protocol to mean an operational protocol specify-
ing messages and the operational constraints on their ordering
and occurrence. Specifically, the question Tosca answers is:
how can we operationalize commitment specifications over
protocols such that liveness and safety are preserved, and
alignment is guaranteed? Tosca’s contribution is a method for
automatically synthesizing the appropriate protocol.
Tosca’s conceptual contribution is bringing three technical
strands on interaction in multiagent systems together. One,
BSPL [Singh, 2011], a declarative language for specifying pro-
tocols. BSPLprotocols are known as information protocols be-
cause ordering and occurrence constraints fall out from more
fundamental causality and integrity constraints on information
inmessages. ABSPL protocol can be checked for liveness and
safety [Singh, 2012]. Two, Cupid [Chopra and Singh, 2015a],
a declarative language for specifying commitments. The
semantics of Cupid is in terms of commitment-oriented
queries on a relational database. Thus we may imagine an
agent that runs (for whatever purpose) commitment-oriented
queries on its local database. Three, research on alignment
[Chopra and Singh, 2015b] (C&S, for brevity), which is about
mechanisms for ensuring that the parties to a commitment (the
debtor and creditor) always progress toward states where they
make mutually compatible local inferences about the commit-
ment. Specifically, whenever the creditor infers a commitment
as active from themessages it has observed, the debtormust as
well infer it as active from its own observations.
Architecturally, Tosca brings the three strands together
in the following manner. Each agent’s local database or
state comprises the messages it would have sent or received
following a BSPL protocol. Cupid enables inferring the states
of the commitments an agent is party to from this database.
However, because each agent carries out this inference on
its own local state, it may turn out that agents are not aligned
with respect to a commitment. Tosca gives a method for
ensuring progress toward alignment. Specifically, given a
BSPL protocol and a set of commitments defined over the
messages in the protocol, it gives a method for synthesizing a
BSPL protocol whose enactment guarantees progress toward
alignment. Furthermore, if the input protocol is live and safe,
the synthesized protocol is live and safe as well.
Tosca goes beyond C&S in two ways. One, it addresses
alignment for a more expressive language that includes
deadlines, nested commitments, and a richer commitment
lifecycle. Two, whereas C&S give algorithms for alignment,
thereby constraining the implementation of agents, Tosca
gives a purely interactive solution in terms of a protocolwhose
enactment would guarantee alignment.
2 Background
We now overview BSPL and Cupid, where for clarity we
use message (as in BSPL) and commitment (as in Cupid)
to mean instances, and specification to mean the respective
specifications.
2.1 BSPL
BSPL is used to declaratively specify protocols with-
out explicit control flow. By contrast, languages
such as AUML [Huget and Odell, 2004] and RASA
[Miller andMcginnis, 2007] rely on explicitly specifying
message ordering. Instead, BSPL protocols impose in-
formation causality constraints on each message m: what
information m’s emission creates and what information the
sending role must know before sending m. Thus, an implicit
message ordering is imposed based solely on a protocol’s
explicit and declarative information causality specification.
Listing 1 demonstrates BSPL via the Ordering protocol.
From here on, we describe such a protocol as an “input
protocol” for Tosca, because it provides general message
schemas for taking communicative actions (instantiating
messages) and it is distinguished from a synthesized protocol
for aligning a commitment.
The protocol Ordering has the roles M (merchant), C
(customer), and S (shipper); and the parameters oID (order
identifier), item, price, pID (pay identifier), rID (request
identifier), and sID (ship identifier).
A complete enactment of Ordering comprises a tuple of
bindings for all of its parameters. All parameters are adorned
poutq for the protocol as awhole,meaning that their values are
bound by enacting the protocol. ParameteroID is annotated as
a key for the other parameters. This means each oID binding
corresponds to a distinct tuple of bindings for non key param-
eters and thus identifies Ordering’s enactment. For example,
it is not possible for the merchant to send two quotes with key
binding oID = 1 and different non key parameter bindings.
Ordering declares four message schemas (their placement
is irrelevant). By convention, any key parameter of the pro-
tocol is a key parameter for any message in which it appears.
The message schema quote on Line 4 is from the merchant to
the customer. It has three parameters, whose values are bound
by sending a quote due to being adorned poutq, namely oID,
item, and price.
The message schema pay on Line 5 is from the customer
to the merchant. It comprises one parameter adorned pinq,
namely oID, whichmeans that its valuebindingmust be known
viamessage emission or reception before a paymessage is sent
from the customer to themerchant. For example, the customer
cannot send a pay message with pinq parameter binding oID
= 1 before receiving a quote message with the same binding.
Hence, the customer can only send a pay message after
receiving a quote from the merchant with the same key value,
based on the information (parameter) causality constraints.
Likewise, the message schema requestShip on Line 6 is
from the merchant to the shipper and it has the pinq parameter
oID. Finally, ship on Line 7 has the oID parameter adorned
pinq. Since the shipper can only know about oID ’s binding by
receiving a requestShip message from the merchant, ship can
only be sent after being requested.
Listing 1: A BSPL protocol for placing and fulfilling orders.
1 Orde r i ng {
2 roles M, C, S / / Merchant , Customer , Sh i ppe r
3 parameters ou t oID key , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ,
ou t pID , ou t rID , ou t sID
4 M 7→ C: quo t e [ ou t oID , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ]
5 C 7→ M: pay [ i n oID , ou t pID ]
6 M 7→ S : r e q u e s t S h i p [ i n oID , ou t r ID ]
7 S 7→ C: s h i p [ i n oID , ou t sID ] }
2.2 Cupid
Cupid is a language for specifying commitments over an
event database schema and inferring commitment states based
on an event database state. In this paper, we only consider
defining commitments over protocolmessage schemas, where
commitments are inferred over messages.
We demonstrate Cupid’s basic ideas with an example
commitment in Listing 2 defined on top of the message
schemas of Listing 1.
Listing 2: A specification in Cupid’s surface syntax.
commitment Pur cha s e M to C
create quo t e
detach pay [ , quo t e + 10]
discharge s h i p [ , pay + 5]
A Purchase commitment from M (merchant) to C (cus-
tomer) is created when a quote is made. The created
commitment is uniquely identified by quote’s key (oID ).
Purchase is detached if a payment correlated to a quote occurs
within ten time points of the quote (pay and quote both have
the same key, oID ). If the payment does not occur by the dead-
line, then the commitment is expired (failure to meet detach).
The commitment is discharged if the (correlated) shipment
occurs within five time points of the payment; if the shipment
does not happen by the deadline, the commitment is violated
(failure to meet discharge). Cupid treats such lifecycle events
as first-class events, meaning that one commitment’s lifecycle
event may depend upon another’s.
2.3 Separation of Concerns
Architecturally, Tosca uses BSPL to specify the operational
layer interaction focusing on informational causality, as a sep-
arate concern from the interaction requirements specified in
Cupid. For example, we could change Listing 1’s requestShip
message schema to be causally dependent on pay’s identifier
(pID ) before emission:
M CS
quote
1
pay
2
requestShip
3
ship4
(A)
M CS E
quote
payEscro
w
5
fwdCMPayEscrow
6
requestShip
ship
(B)
Figure 1: Protocol enactment for Merchant, Shipper, Escrow, and
Customer roles.
1 M 7→ S : r e q u e s t S h i p [ i n oID , i n pID , ou t
r ID ]
The modified information causality does not alter the fact
that the Purchase commitment continues to be discharged by
a ship message within five time points of the pay message.
The modification does alter when these messages can be sent.
Conversely, changing thePurchase commitment in Listing 2’s
discharge from ship to another message would not affect if
and when ship can be sent.
Tosca’s separation of concerns supports modularity: swap-
ping out a protocol or modifying its information causality
does not affect commitment level requirements, only when
information (descriptively) can be created and thus when
commitments can be met; changing a commitment does
not affect if and when information can be created, only the
(prescriptive)messaging requirements between parties.
3 Technical Motivation
We now demonstrate commitment operationalization proto-
cols, which support realizing a commitment’s lifecycle and
progression towards alignment via messaging. Specifically,
given a commitment defined over an input protocol that po-
tentially causes misalignment, we synthesize a commitment
alignment protocol as output.
A commitment alignment protocol includes the necessary
message schemas for forwardingmessages to the creditor and
debtor in order to guarantee commitment alignment. Together,
an input protocol and multiple commitment alignment proto-
cols are composed to form a commitment operationalization
protocol.
3.1 Commitments Guaranteed Alignment
The Purchase commitment in Listing 2 is already alignable
for the create, detach, discharge, and expired lifecycle events
by the input protocol, Ordering, in Listing 1. In Figure 1 (A),
at time point 1 after the merchant sends the customer a quote
but before the customer receives it, the debtor (merchant)
infers that the Purchase commitment is created. Hence the
commitment is already aligned (the debtor knows that they are
committed) regardless of what the creditor (customer) knows.
When the customer emits pay before time point 2 they infer
that the Purchase commitment is detached. Hence, Purchase
becomes misaligned, since the creditor (customer) has a
stronger expectation of the debtor (merchant) to discharge
the commitment, which the debtor does not know. The
misalignment is rectified at time point 3, after the merchant
receives the pay message.
Subsequently, after the merchant requests the shipper to
ship, the shipper sends a ship message to the customer. At
time point 4, after receiving the ship message, the creditor
(customer) infers that the commitment is discharged and
hence does not have a stronger expectation of the debtor
(merchant) than what the debtor knows about (alignment).
Alignment for create, detach, discharge, and expired life-
cycle events is guaranteed, either because misalignment does
not occur (the creditor does not infer stronger expectations of
the debtor) or misalignment is rectified via message reception.
However, if ship is received after five time points of payment,
then the creditor (customer) infers violation whereas the
debtor (merchant) cannot (permanent misalignment). Such
misalignment requires message forwarding, (e.g., notifying
the debtor of ship), which we will cover in the next section.
3.2 Commitments Requiring Forwarding
Suppose an escrow service is used instead of direct payment
from the customer to themerchant. TheEscrowOrdering input
protocol in Listing 3 and the EscrowPurchase commitment in
Listing 4 capture this situation.
Listing 3: An input protocol providing messaging for placing and
carrying out orders using an escrow service.
1 EscrowOrder ing {
2 roles E , M, C , S / / Escrow , Merchant ,
Customer , Sh i ppe r
3 parameters ou t oID key , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ,
ou t pID , ou t rID , ou t sID , ou t t ID
4
5 M 7→ C: quo t e [ ou t oID , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ]
6 C 7→ E : payEscrow [ i n oID , ou t pID ]
7 M 7→ S : r e q u e s t S h i p [ i n oID , ou t r ID ]
8 S 7→ C: s h i p [ i n oID , ou t sID ]
9 E 7→ M: payT r a n s f e r [ i n oID , i n pID , ou t
t ID ] }
Listing 4: A commitment to capture escrow payment.
commitment EscrowPurchase M to C
create quo t e
detach payEscrow [ , quo t e + 10]
discharge s h i p [ , payEscrow + 5]
In this scenario, we need to introduce a message that for-
wards another message’s occurrence to an otherwise ignorant
party. Listing 5 shows a protocol that introduces message
forwarding in order to align the EscrowPurchase commit-
ment (Listing 4) for the input protocol, EscrowOrdering in
Listing 3. Specifically, by incorporating the message schema,
fwdCMPayEscrowID, for forwarding payEscrow from the
customer to the merchant. Each forwarding message schema
has a distinct namemapped to the message being forwarded.
To exemplify, in Figure 1(B) the customer sends payEscrow
to the escrow. At time point 5 we have misalignment, because
the customer (creditor) infers the EscrowPurchase’s detach
and an expectation for the merchant to ship the goods. Yet the
debtor (merchant) cannot know the customer’s expectation
without notification. Misalignment is resolved at time point 6
once the customer forwards payEscrow to the merchant via
fwdCMPayEscrow. Both roles know that the debtor (mer-
chant) is expected to discharge the commitment (alignment).
Listing 5: A protocol for aligning the EscrowPurchase commitment
in Listing 4.
1 EscrowPurchaseAl{
2 roles C, M
3 parameters i n oID key , i n pID , ou t
fwdCMPayEscrowID
4
5 C 7→ M: fwdCMPayEscrow [ i n oID , i n pID ,
6 ou t fwdCMPayEscrowID ] }
3.3 Nested Commitments
We now consider the case where one commitment’s lifecycle
event depends upon another’s (nesting). The EscrowTransfer
commitment given in Listing 6 is defined over the message
schemas from the input protocolEscrowOrdering in Listing 3.
The escrow service is committed to the merchant to transfer
the customer’s payment, onceEscrowPurchase is discharged.
Listing 6: Escrow service’s commitment to the merchant.
commitment Esc r owTrans f e r E to M
create payEscrow
detach d i s c h a r g e d ( Esc rowPurchase )
discharge p ayT r a n s f e r [ ,
d i s c h a r g e d ( Esc rowPurchase ) + 5]
EscrowTransfer is operationalizedwith the protocol in List-
ing 7. Focusing on the nested lifecycle event, the idea is that
if EscrowTransfer’s creditor (merchant) infers its detach, then
so should the debtor (escrow). EscrowTransfer’s detach is
EscrowPurchase’s discharge. Hence we ensure that whenever
a message contributes to EscrowPurchase’s discharge it can
be forwarded to EscrowTransfer’s debtor (escrow).
Listing 7: A protocol for aligning the EscrowTransfer commitment
in Listing 6.
1 Esc r owTrans f e rA l {
2 roles C, E , M / / Customer , Escrow , Merchant
3 parameters i n oID key , i n i tem , i n p r i c e ,
i n pID , i n sID , ou t fwdMEQuoteID , ou t
fwdCMPayEscrowID , ou t fwdSEShipID ,
ou t fwdMEShipID
4
5 M 7→ E : fwdMEQuote [ i n oID , i n i tem , i n
p r i c e , ou t fwdMEQuoteID ]
6 C 7→ M: fwdCMPayEscrow [ i n oID , i n pID , ou t
fwdCMPayEscrowID ]
7 S 7→ E : fwdSEShip [ i n oID , i n sID , ou t
fwdSEShipID ] }
8 M 7→ E : fwdMEShip [ i n oID , i n sID , ou t
fwdMEShipID ] }
In Figure 2 at time point 7, the merchant infers EscrowPur-
chase’s discharge and consequently EscrowTransfer’s detach.
Specifically, due to knowing about the messages contribut-
ing to EscrowPurchase’s discharge: quote (by sending it),
payEscrow (via the forwarding message fwdCMPayEscrow),
and ship (via the forwarding message fwdSMShip). Yet the
debtor (escrow) neither infers EscrowPurchase’s discharge
nor consequently EscrowTransfer’s detach. Hence, the cred-
itor (merchant) expects the debtor (escrow) to discharge Es-
crowTransfer, which the debtor is unaware of (misalignment).
M CS E
quote
fwdMEQuote
payEscrow
fwdCMPayEscrow
requestShip
ship
fwdSMShip
7
fwdSEShip8
payTransfer
Figure 2: Protocol enactment for Merchant, Shipper, Escrow, and
Customer roles where each message shares key values.
Forwarding message schemas to the escrow support
rectifying the misalignment. EscrowPurchase’s discharge
is due to: quote, which can be forwarded to the escrow;
payEscrow, which the escrow receives (hence no forwarding
is required) and ship, which can be forwarded to the escrow.
In Figure 1 at time point 8, after sending the forwarding
messages, escrow knows about EscrowPurchase’s discharge
and thus EscrowTransfer’s detach (alignment).
3.4 Compositionality
Commitment alignment protocols can be synthesized inde-
pendently and then composed. In Listing 8, our preceding
commitment alignment protocols are subprotocols of an over-
all operationalization protocol. If two commitment alignment
protocols bind the same poutq parameter, it is due to the same
message being sent and hence the binding is the same. For ex-
ample fwdCMPayEscrowID is bound by EscrowPurchaseAl
when a forward message fwdCMPayEscrow is sent if and
only if fwdCMPayEscrowID is bound with the same value
by EscrowTransferAl when the same fwdCMPayEscrow
message is sent. Hence, independently constructed alignment
protocols are composed together without contradictory
parameter bindings during enactment.
Listing 8: An operationalization protocol composed from an input
protocol and synthesized alignment protocols.
1 Op e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n P r o t o c o l {
2 roles M, C, E , S
3 parameters ou t oID key , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ,
ou t pID , ou t sID , ou t rID , ou t tID ,
ou t fwdMEQuoteID , ou t fwdCMPayEscrowI ,
ou t fwdSEShipID , ou t fwdMEShipID
4
5 EscrowOrder ing (M,
C , E , S , ou t oID , ou t i tem , ou t p r i c e ,
ou t pID , ou t sID , ou t rID , ou t t ID )
6 EscrowPurchaseAl (E , M, C , S ,
i n oID , i n pID , ou t fwdCMPayEscrowID )
7 Esc r owTrans f e rA l (C , E , M, S , i n oID ,
i n i tem , i n p r i c e , i n pID , i n sID , ou t
fwdMEQuoteID , ou t fwdCMPayEscrowID ,
ou t fwdSEShipID , ou t fwdMEShipID ) }
3.5 Summary
Tosca synthesizes the alignment protocol for a commitment
and an input protocol. The alignment protocol comprises
forwarding message schemas, supporting participants in
aligning the commitment via messaging. Multiple commit-
ment alignment protocols are composed together, without
parameter interference, into an operationalization protocol for
triggering commitment lifecycles and supporting alignment
via messaging.
4 Synthesizing Protocols
4.1 Protocols
We adopt BSPL’s formal syntax from [Singh, 2012]. We use
the following lists treated as sets: public roles~x, private roles~y,
public parameters~p, pkeyq parameters~k⊆~p, pinq parameters
~pI ⊆ ~p, poutq parameters ~pO ⊆ ~p, private parameters ~q, and
parameter bindings ~v and ~w. The set of all parameters is
~p=~pI∪~pO. The pinq and poutq parameters are mutually dis-
joint: ~pI∩~pO = /0. A protocol’s references (i.e., subprotocols,
includingmessage schemas) are denoted by the set F .
Definition 1. A protocol is a tuple P = 〈n,~x,~y, ~p,~k,~q,F〉
where n is a name. ~x,~y,~p,~q are as above, F is a finite set of f
subprotocol references F = {F1,...,Ff }, such that P includes
each referenced sub protocol Fi’s roles, and key and non key
parameters (∀i : 1≤ i≤ f ⇒Fi= 〈ni,~xi,~pi,~ki〉)where~xi⊆~x∪~y,
~pi⊆~p∪~q,~ki=~pi∩~k). An atomic protocol with two roles and
no references is a message schema denoted as ⌈s 7→r :m~p(~k)⌉.
Later, protocol enactment is defined over a Universe of
Discourse (UoD) comprising roles and message schemas (for
convenience we modify the original BSPL definition from a
UoD comprisingmessage references).
Definition 2. [Singh, 2012, Def. 12] The UoD of protocol P,
UoD(P)=〈R,M〉 consists of P’s roles andmessage schemas
including the message schemas of its referenced protocols
recursively.
4.2 Commitments
A commitment specification is a finite string according to
the corresponding representation in Table 1 over a message
schema name set Base.
A commitment specification, c(x, y, Cre, Det, Dis) from
a debtor x to a creditor y is defined over BSPL protocol
message schema references (Base events) used by an input
protocol. Role names and time instants are sets R and
T , respectively. Operators ⊓, ⊔, and ⊖ are respectively
conjunction, disjunction, and exception. In E[l,r], [l,r] is the
time interval that E[l,r] occurs within. We omit l and r when
they are respectively 0 and∞.
4.3 Commitment Operationalization
Each commitment we wish to operationalize is rewritten into
a commitment alignment protocol for an input protocol. A
forwarding message schema has a unique name and poutq
parameter, to avoid conflicts with other message schemas.
Let N be the set of unique message forwarding schema
names disjoint from the message schema name set Base.
Unique forwarding message schema names are obtained
taking as input a message schema name from Base and a
role, and then outputting a forwardingmessage schema name,
Table 1: Cupid’s grammar. Expr is create, detach, and discharge
conditions.
Event −→ Base | LifeEvent
LifeEvent−→ created(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr) |
detached(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr) |
discharged(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr) |
expired(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr) |
violated(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr)
Expr −→ Event[Time, Time] | Expr ⊓Expr|Expr ⊔Expr|
Expr⊖ Expr
Time −→ Event + T | T
ComSpec −→ c(R,R, Expr, Expr, Expr)
using an assumed injective function V : Base × R → N .
For example, fwdSEShip = V (ship,E) is a unique name for
forwarding ship from the shipper (S) to the escrow (E). The
inverse injective function V−1 determines which message
is being forwarded. An assumed injective parameter name
function VID :N → ID from forwarding message names to
identifier parameter names (ID) produces a uniquely named
poutq parameter for each forwarding message schema (e.g.,
fwdSEShipID=VID(fwdSEShip)).
A forwardingmessage schema is included in a commitment
operationalization protocol when necessary to support com-
mitment alignment. For example, if E is the commitment’s
create condition, b the debtor and a the creditor. Then, the
event formula E must be aligned between roles a and b such
that if a knowsE then b can learn ofE viamessage forwarding.
Each commitment C is decomposed via rewrites into
instructions of the form al(a,E,b) stating a requirement for
E to be aligned from a to b. If the formula E is non atomic,
then it is further decomposed to eventually atomic alignment
instructions, al(a, m, b) on messages m. Atomic message
alignment instructions are rewritten into the necessary mes-
sage forwarding schema in the alignment protocol that we are
constructing. We present the base case rewrites for alignment
instructions operating on message schemas, then non atomic
event formulae and finally commitments.
The presented rewrite rules are for an input protocol
P= 〈n,~x,~y,~p,~k,~q,F〉 and its Universe of Discourse 〈R,M〉=
UoD(P), a commitment C and the commitment alignment
protocolPC=〈nC,~xC,~yC,~pC,~kC,~qC,FC〉 being constructed.
Rule R1 handles aligning an atomic message. It is con-
ditional on: (1) An atomic message alignment instruction
al(a,m,b). (2) The commitment alignment protocol PC being
constructed. (3) A message schema in the input protocol P
where a role s that is distinct from b instantiates the message
m via emission to a role r distinct from b.
The rewrite result is: (4) A new message schema labeled
mforw acting to forward message schema m’s instances, from
the role s to the role b. (5) The commitment alignment
protocol referencing mforw. (6) The commitment alignment
protocol including the forwarding message schema’s pkeyq
parameters, (7) pinq and poutq parameters, and roles.
al(a,m,b), (1)
PC=〈nC,~xC,~yC,~pC,~kC,~qC,FC〉, (2)
⌈s 7→r :m~p(~k)⌉∈M, s 6=b,r 6=b (3)
⌈s 7→b :mforw~pforw(~kforw)⌉ (4)
FC=FC∪{mforw}, (5)
~kC=~kC∪~k, (6)
pCI = p
C
I ∪p
forw
I , p
C
O= p
C
O∪p
forw
O ,~x
C=~x∪~xC (7)
(R1)
Where:
• The uniquely named forwarding message schema
forwardsm to b: mforw=V (m,b).
• The forwarding message schema’s parameters comprise:
keys corresponding to m’s (kforw = k); a unique poutq
parameter to ensure that protocol enactment requires
forwarding (p
forw
O ={VID(m
forw)}); and pinq parameters
matching m’s parameters (p
forw
I = p), meaning that m
must be instantiated prior to it being forwarded.
Instructions to align messages from a to b occurring within
a time window are reduced to atomic message alignment
instructions. The message that occurs as well as any start
or deadline messages are necessarily also aligned from a to
b according to the rewrite Rule R4 (omitting cases for time
windowswithout either a start time, a deadline, or both).
al(a,m[s±J,d±K],b)
al(a,m,b) al(a,s,b) al(a,d,b)
(R4)
To give an example, the EscrowPurchase commitment
from the merchant to the customer in Listing 4 is detached
when the customer pays the escrow within ten time points
of a price quote. Hence we have an alignment instruction
al(C, payEscrow[, quote + 10],M) to ensure that when the
creditor (customer) knows the detachment so does the
debtor (merchant). The alignment instruction is reduced to
al(C,payEscrow,M) and al(C,quote,M).
In the input protocol in Listing 3 quote is from the
merchant to the customer, guaranteeing alignment, and so
al(C,quote,M) is not rewritten. However, payEscrow is not
received or sent by themerchant and hencemust be forwarded
by the customer. The instruction al(C, payEscrow, M) is
rewritten to a message schema as in Listing 9.
Listing 9: A partial alignment protocol for the EscrowPurchase
commitment in Listing 4
1 EscrowPurchaseAl{
2 roles C, M
3parameters i n oID key , i n pID , ou t
fwdCMPayEscrowID
4C 7→ M: fwdCMPayEscrow [ i n oID , i n pID , ou t
fwdCMPayEscrowID ] }
Both sides of a conjunct are aligned according to Rule R5.
Likewise both sides of a disjunct are aligned viaRuleR6, since
we do not knowwhich runtimemessages will occur a priori.
Exceptions are handled by Rule R7. In order to guarantee
that when a role a knows L⊖R then so does b, we must ensure
that if a knows L then so can b via messaging. Yet, if b knows
R then it will never know L⊖R to be true, even if a knows L,
believes L⊖R is true and so forwards L to b. Thus we align L
from a to b and R from b to a.
al(a,L⊓R,b)
al(a,L,b) al(a,R,b)
(R5)
al(a,L⊔R,b)
al(a,L,b) al(a,R,b)
(R6)
al(a,L⊖R,b)
al(a,L,b) al(b,R,a)
(R7)
For example, a shipment commitment from the ship-
per to the merchant is discharged if: the item is shipped
within five time points of the shipment being requested,
except if the shipment is reported as damaged within
five time points of being received. Thus we have an
alignment instruction from the shipper to the merchant:
al(S, ship[, requestShip+ 5] ⊖ reportDamage[, ship + 5],M).
Alignment holds when: if the shipper knows
ship[,requestShip+5] then so does themerchant and if themer-
chant knows the exception reportDamage[,ship+ 5] then so
does the shipper. Hence the alignment instruction is rewritten
to al(S,ship[requestShip+5],M) and al(M,reportDamage,S).
Nested commitment lifecycle events occur when the
corresponding lifecycle event for the referenced commitment
c(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis) occurs. Hence, we rewrite nested lifecycle
events to the conditions under which they occur according to
Cupid’s semantics with Rules R8 to R12.
al(a,created(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),b)
al(a,Cre,b)
(R8)
al(a,detached(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),b)
al(a,Cre⊓Det,b)
(R9)
al(a,discharged(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),b)
al(a,(Cre⊓Dis)⊔(Det⊓Dis),b)
(R10)
al(a,expired(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),b)
al(a,Cre⊖Det,b)
(R11)
al(a,violated(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),b)
al(a,(Cre⊓Det)⊖Disch,b)
(R12)
The final rewrite is for commitments. A commitment is
aligned when: if the creditor knows it is created, detached,
or violated, then the debtor respectively knows it is created,
detached, or violated; and if the debtor knows it is discharged
or expired, then the creditor knows it is respectively dis-
charged or expired. Owing to this asymmetry, we rewrite a
commitment with Rule R13 to alignment instructions for each
lifecycle event.
c(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis)
al(c,created(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),d)
al(c,detached(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),d)
al(c,violated(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),d)
al(d,discharged(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),c)
al(d,expired(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis),c)
(R13)
We now define a commitment alignment protocol.
Definition 3. A protocol PC is a commitment alignment
protocol for a commitment C and an input protocol P iff all
possible applications of R1 to R13 are made to C, an empty
version of PC and P’s UoD 〈R,M〉=UoD(P).
Each rule is a monotonic reduction on finite formulae.
Hence:
Lemma 1. There exists a commitment operationalization
protocolPC for each commitmentC and input protocolP.
An operationalization protocol is composed from the input
protocol and commitment alignment protocols (omitting
empty and redundant subprotocols).
Definition 4. LetP=〈n,~x,~y,~p,~k,~q,F〉 be an input protocol and
C be a set of commitments defined over the message schema
names and roles in P’s Universe of Discourse 〈R,M〉 =
UoD(P). Let each commitment C ∈ C have an alignment
protocol PC = 〈nC,~xC,~yC,~pC,~kC,~qC,FC〉 for P that includes at
least two roles (|~xc|≥2). PC= 〈nC,~xC,~yC,~pC,~kC,~qC,FC〉 is an
operationalization protocol forC and P iff:
PC references the input protocol and all commitment
operationalization protocols: FC={n}∪
⋃
C∈C{n
C}.
PC’s roles and key parameters match the input protocol’s:
~xC=~x and~kC=~k.
P’s poutq parameters comprise the input protocol’s and
each commitment alignment protocol’s poutq parameters:
~pCO={~pO}∪
⋃
C∈C{~p
C
O}.
4.4 Semantics
In BSPL, each message instance m[s,r,~p,~v] denotes a sending
role s, a recipient r, a parameter vector~pwith a corresponding
parameter binding value vector ~v. A role’s history denotes
its sent and received messages in sequence. A history vector
comprises each role’s history where every received message
must have been sent.
Definition 5. [Singh, 2012, Def. 5] A history of a role ρ , Hρ ,
is given by a sequence of zero or more message instances
m1 ◦m2 ◦ .... Each mi is of the form m[s,r,~p,~v] where ρ = s or
ρ =r, and ◦means sequencing.
Definition 6. [Singh, 2012, Def. 7]We define a history vector
for a UoDR,M, as [H1,...,H |R|], such that ∀s,r :1≤s,r≤|R|
: Hs is a history s.t. ∀m[s, r, ~p,~v] ∈ Hr : m ∈ M and
m[s,r,~p,~v]∈Hs.
A history vector is viable if and only if sent and received
messages bind values to parameters specified in each cor-
responding message schema, respecting values already
determined by keys via known messages (for brevity, we
omit Singh’s [2012, Def. 8] definition). The set of all viable
history vectors for a UoD (e.g., a protocol’s roles andmessage
schemas) is its Universe of Enactments.
Definition 7. Given a UoD 〈R,M〉, the Universe of Enact-
ments (UoE) for that UoD, UR,M, is the set of viable history
vectors [2012, Definition 8], each of which has exactly |R|
dimensions and each of whosemessages instantiates a schema
inM.
In Cupid [Chopra and Singh, 2015a], an agent’s model
maps from event schemas to event instances, representing the
agent’s local view of event occurrences. Here, we are dealing
with messages and hence a model is simply a role’s history
albeit substituting each forwardingmessage with the message
it forwards and timestamping each message with the time it
became known (via emission, reception, or notification).
Definition 8. Let P be an input protocol and let Base be the
message schema names for the message schemas in P’s UoD.
Let PC be an operationalization protocol for P. A model
for a role a’s history H and PC is a history M, where each
message is in the model mMi [s
M
i , r
M
i , ~p
M,~vM] ∈ M iff there
is a corresponding original message mHi [s
H
i , r
H
i ,~p
H ,~vH ] ∈ H
meeting (a) or (b), and (c):
(a) The corresponding original message in H is a non
forwarding message mHi ∈ Base and the names match:
mMi =m
H
i .
(b) The corresponding original message mHi in H is
a forwarding message and the message mMi in the
model takes the name of the message being forwarded:
mMi =V
−1(mHi ,r
H
i ).
(c) The message mMi contains all of the original message
mHi in H’s non forwarding ID parameters and parameter
bindings with an additional timestamp parameter and
parameter binding: if ∃~pHj ∈ ~p
H = VID−1(mHi ) then
~pMi = (~p
H
i \~p
H
j ) ∪ {time} and ~v
M
i = (~v
H
i \~v
H
j ) ∪ {t},
otherwise ~pMi =~p
H
j ∪{time} and~v
M
i =~v
H
j ∪{t}, where t
is a timestamp.
We adopt Cupid’s commitment semantics. For brevity, we
only define the set of instances for event formula E (e.g., a
lifecycle event) entailed by a model M: JEKM . If E is a non
atomic event formula or a lifecycle event, then the result is
a database operation on the messages that cause E to occur.
For example, the set of all ship instances is denoted as JshipK.
Moreover, the set of tuples modeled by the formulae for
shipment occurring within ten time points, ship[0, 10], is
returned by selecting all shipment events that occur between
zero and ten time points (Jship[0,10]K= σ0≤t<10(JshipK)). A
database operation is inductively defined in Cupid for queries
corresponding to each event formula type.
Definition 9. Let M be a model and E an event formula.
JEKM is the set of E’s instances (a set of tuples combining
stored events) returned from the query for E on M according
to [Chopra and Singh, 2015a,D1−D20].
5 Properties
An operationalization protocol retains an input protocol’s
message ordering.
Lemma 2. Let P be an input protocol, and PC be a commit-
ment operationalization protocol. If there is a history vector
H in UoD(P)’s UoE then there exists a history vector HC
in UoD(PC)’s UoE where for each history H iC in HC the
messages instantiating schemas in M are included in the
same order of the corresponding historyH i inH.
Proof sketch. We include messages from the input protocol’s
history to the operationalization protocol’s corresponding his-
tory, if they instantiate a schema in the input protocol. We can
always include received messages ([2012, Def. 6]), emitted
messages can be included since they do not violate bindings
and pinq parameters are necessarily known by binding parame-
ters in the operationalization protocol’smessage schemas.
Singh [2012] formalizes liveness and safety for BSPL,
and gives verification techniques. A protocol is safe iff each
history vector in the UoE preserves uniqueness for each
binding. A protocol is live iff any enactment can progress to
completion such that all parameters are bound.
Theorem 1. Let PC be a commitment operationalization
protocol for an input protocolP. If P is safe then PC is safe. If
P is live then PC is live.
Proof sketch. Safety: AssumePC is unsafe. SincePC is an op-
erationalization protocol, by Rule R1 (7) it does not introduce
poutq parameters used by another message schema, hence by
applying Lemma 2 Pmust be unsafe as well. Liveness: As for
safety, relying on PC not introducing poutq parameters used
by P.
C&S define alignment for active commitments. Defini-
tion 10 generalizes it to all states in Cupid’s commitment
lifecycle. Specifically, if a creditor infers created, detached
or violated of a commitment (thereby strengthening the
expectation) from its history, then the debtormust as well (i.e.,
knowwhat is expected of them). Conversely, if a debtor infers
discharge or expired (hence weakening the expectation), the
creditor must as well.
Definition 10. LetMx andMy be models. The history vector
H is aligned with respect to c(x,y,C,D,U) iff:
i∈Jcreated(x,y,C,D,U)KMy⇒i∈Jcreated(x,y,C,D,U)KMx
i∈Jdetached(x,y,C,D,U)KMy⇒i∈Jdetached(x,y,C,D,U)KMx
i∈Jviolated(x,y,C,D,U)KMy⇒i∈Jviolated(x,y,C,D,U)KMx
i∈Jdischarged(x,y,C,D,U))KMx⇒i∈Jdischarged(x,y,C,D,U)KMy
i∈Jexpired(x,y,C,D,U)KMx⇒i∈Jexpired(x,y,C,D,U)KMy
The idea thatmessages should happen in some time interval
relies on a global clock. However, there is the potential for
misalignment due to message delays and local clock skews,
rather than which messages are emitted and received. Such
problems are avoided by making the time intervals an order of
magnitude larger than the maximum clock skew and message
delays [Cranefield, 2005].
We assume that for a commitment c(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis) being
operationalized with respect to a history vector H if when x
or y knows a messagem and the counter-party receivesm they
will do so at a time to make the same inferences over Cre,
Det, and Dis. Under this assumption, an operationalization
protocol is sufficient to support alignment.
Theorem 2 states that a commitment operationalization
protocol always makes it possible to rectify alignment via
messaging.
Theorem 2. Let PC be a protocol that operationalizes a set of
commitments C such that c(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis) ∈ C. If history
vectorH∈UR,M is in P
C’s UoE then there exists a longerH ′′
in PC’s UoE that is aligned with respect to c(x,y,Cre,Det,Dis).
Proof sketch. If H is misaligned. Definition 10 and Cupid’s
semantics for lifecycle events [Chopra and Singh, 2015a, D15
to D19] imply role s’s model entails E . Base case: E =m. By
R1 extendH to a history vectorH ′′ in PC’s UoE (Definition 7)
by inserting a notification mi from m’s sender to r in their
respective histories. Inductive hypothesis: assume there exists
a history H ′ in PC’s UoE extending H s.t. if E = F ⊓G or
E = F ⊔G then r knows F and G, or for E = F⊖G r knows
F and s knows G. Inductive step: Extend H ′ to H ′′ with an
mi via rules R1 to R12. By the time assumption and Cupid’s
semantic definitions [Chopra and Singh, 2015a, Def. 16 to
Def. 19] s and r are aligned.
6 Conclusions
Tosca addresses challenges of decentralized commitment en-
actment. Given a set of commitments defined over a protocol,
it enables automatically synthesizing a new protocol that sup-
ports alignment, a form of commitment-level interoperability.
Furthermore, the synthesized protocol preserves liveness and
safety, both of which are also necessary for interoperation.
The new protocol may be thought of as a fleshing out of the
input protocol. Tosca brings together several advances—in
the specification of protocols, commitments, and ideas about
interoperability—toward supporting decentralization.
Tosca establishes a separation of concerns between commit-
ments and protocols. Protocols are specified in BSPL whereas
commitments are specified in Cupid—languages developed
independently of each other. Notably, in Cupid, commitments
are defined over a database schema, not a protocol. We use the
fact that BSPL specifications are interpreted over databases in
layering Cupid specifications over BSPL specifications.
Decentralization is a theme of growing interest, (e.g.,
for norm compliance [Baldoni et al., 2015] and monitor-
ing [Bulling et al., 2013]). Tosca’s architecture is distinct
from shared memory (environment) approaches (e.g.,
[Omicini et al., 2008]). Such approaches would benefit from
Tosca in that they would also need a clear specification of
interactions, both in terms of meanings and protocols, even if
alignment itself would be trivial because of shared memory.
Other works treat commitments [Chesani et al., 2013] and
protocols [Yadav et al., 2015] separately without studying
their relationship. Günay et al. [Günay et al., 2015] gen-
erate commitment specifications from requirements. We
understand commitment specifications as requirements and
synthesize operational protocol specifications.
Analogously Searle [1995, pp. 26–27] demarcates between
constitutive rules, which make social actions possible by as-
cribing institutional (social) facts, and norms, which prescribe
institutional facts. This separation is adopted for commitment
protocols overlaying constitutive rules [Baldoni et al., 2013].
Moreover, norms are both defined over institutional facts and
interpreted at different levels of abstraction using constitutive
rules within agents [Criado et al., 2013] and legal institutions
[King, 2016; King et al., 2017]. We separate richer concerns:
commitments, focusing on relational information, overlaying
operational protocols, focusing on information causality.
Future directions should address limitations and further
applications. Tosca maintains agent autonomy, making
alignment possible but not regimented and hence limited by
the extent to which autonomous agents communicatemessage
notifications. We demonstrated Tosca on a business domain
but it could just as well be applied to requirements in other
domains that involve interaction. In particular, healthcare and
government (e.g., national) contracts, studied in connection
with Cupid are prime candidates for Tosca. Since Tosca
provides support for messaging requirements via protocols,
the extent to which it can be applied to agent development
should be investigated (e.g., using communication abstrac-
tions supported in agent programming frameworks such as
[Boissier et al., 2013]).
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